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In the criminal justice context, the state engages in an un-justifiable privacy invasion whenever the monitoring of its citizens results in the abuse of its power. This abuse can 
come in the form of the prohibition of activities that society 
views as valuable; the creation of a sense of being constant-
ly monitored by the state, which then has a chilling effect on 
these activities; or the unjustifiable aggregation of data on the 
state’s citizens. These abuses result in serious dignitary harms 
because of the level of suspicion and distrust they thrust upon 
the individual.
According to Anglo-American ethicists in the Kantian tra-
dition, “[s]elf consciousness, free-will, rationality, moral agen-
cy, and the ability to form life plans are essential traits of per-
sonhood.” Privacy creates, sustains, and enhances personhood 
because it provides individuals with the space to develop these 
traits without the fear of being monitored, judged, and some-
times even unjustifiably punished. The war on crime creates 
such an oppressive feeling of being watched by the state, that 
it at minimum has a chilling effect on poor people of color’s 
self-determination, self-expression, and freedom of association. 
Excerpted from Watching Me: The War on Crime, Privacy, and the State, 47 U.C. Davis Law 
Review 1539 (2014)
WATCHING ME
The War on Crime, Privacy, and the State
BY KIMBERLY D. BAILEY
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Self-determination enables an individual 
to create the life that one wants to create. 
Self-expression and freedom of associa-
tion allow for the free exchange of ideas 
and experimentation with one’s identity, 
which are both important for self-devel-
opment. They also make it easier for one’s 
ideas and cultural identity to become part 
of mainstream political discourse. In addi-
tion, freedom of association, particularly 
with a diverse group of people, increases 
a poor person of color’s social capital and 
chances for upward mobility. 
Because privacy is the foundation for 
freedoms that enable the creation of one’s 
identity and life plans, the more privacy 
one has, the less vulnerable he is to oppres-
sive state social control. For this reason, 
the level of privacy granted by the state 
has historically tracked the level of one’s 
political power and status. Wealthy, white 
men historically have had the greatest 
amount of privacy; women, the poor, and 
people of color have had the least amount 
of privacy, and, therefore, they have been 
vulnerable to more severe policies of state 
social control. 
Scholars have documented the fact that the poor and people of color continue 
to have the least amount of privacy in our 
society and, therefore, they are still the 
most vulnerable to more extreme state 
social control policies.
In addition to making poor people of color more vulnerable to oppressive 
state social control, the war on crime 
has also created serious dignitary harms. 
When the state curtails privacy, it sends 
a powerful message: an individual cannot 
be trusted to use his privacy in legitimate 
ways. For example, parents tend to give 
their children less privacy because they do 
not yet trust that the children have the 
maturity and wisdom not to make choices 
that could potentially harm themselves or 
others. Likewise, one reason we limit the 
privacy of prisoners is because their past 
acts suggest that we cannot trust them not 
to engage in criminal and potentially dan-
gerous activities, at least for a set period 
of time. The lack of trust expressed by the 
state through the war on crime, therefore, 
at best resembles a form of paternalism; at 
worst, it resembles a form de facto crim-
inalization of individuals simply because 
they are poor and of color. These individ-
uals logically conclude that the state does 
not respect them nor does it view their 
identities and viewpoints as equal to those 
of white and wealthier citizens. 
It is important to stress just how in-
trusive stops-and-frisks and motor stops 
are; they are more than just minor an-
noyances. Many individuals, particularly 
young men of color, must endure these 
stops monthly, weekly, and sometimes 
even daily. The intensity and frequency 
of these stops makes these individuals feel 
as if they are constantly being watched by 
the state. As a result, some inner-city resi-
dents of New York have reported that they 
limit the amount of time that they spend 
on the street and that they go outside 
only when necessary in order to mitigate 
constant monitoring by the police and to 
maintain some sense of anonymity from 
the state. This limitation on their mobili-
ty necessarily undermines their ability to 
create the types of lives that they want to 
create through self-determination. This 
limitation also has a chilling effect on their 
associations with their neighbors, and it 
makes associations with those outside of 
their neighborhood, particularly those 
who are of other races, very difficult. In 
addition, the fact that some poor people 
of color feel the need to look less “ethnic” 
in order to avoid being a target for con-
stant monitoring, because of racial and 
socioeconomic biases, shows that the war 
Watching Me
on crime has led some to severely limit 
their sense of self-expression out of desire 
to keep some of their privacy. This fact is 
significant because how one dresses and 
how one wears one’s hair are important 
expressions of one’s personal and cultural 
identity.
These stops are also problematic because this constant barrage of 
questioning regarding one’s activities and 
comings and goings expresses the lack of 
trust that the state has for poor people of 
color. It does not matter that innocent 
individuals do not have anything to hide, 
this lack of trust shows a suspicion that 
these individuals need to be constantly 
watched in order to keep them in line. 
The fact that this sentiment is often 
expressed in a public setting intensifies 
the insult to their dignity because these 
individuals must bear the shame that oth-
ers might assume that the stops confirm 
that poor people of color must always be 
watched. Furthermore, the fact that white 
and wealthier individuals do not have to 
endure these stops with the frequency 
that poor people of color do expresses 
that whites and wealthier individuals are 
worthy of more privacy, and, therefore, 
more trust and respect.
Another troubling aspect of the war 
on crime is the practice of data collection 
through technology . . . Some may think it 
alarmist to consider whether the aggrega-
tion of data through technology will really 
have such a chilling effect, especially for 
innocent individuals who have nothing to 
hide or for those who do not even know 
that the data collection is happening. The 
problem is that even innocent conduct 
can sometimes be embarrassing or simply 
politically unpopular. This type of infor-
mation could potentially affect one’s job 
prospects, housing opportunities, and 
social relationships if made public. Fur-
thermore, the volume of information that 
the state can gather through technology 
is much greater than traditional police 
surveillance techniques. For these rea-
sons, some anonymity from the state via 
technology is essential in order to prevent 
this type of information from providing 
opportunities for state abuse.
Another weapon in the war on crime arsenal is the snitch. It is important 
to differentiate snitches from law-abiding 
citizens who report crime in their commu-
nities. A snitch is someone who engages in 
crime and then reports criminal activity 
to the government in order to obtain less-
er punishment or no punishment at all ... 
Because drug arrests disproportionately 
affect African-Americans and Latinos, 
there are a disproportionate number of 
snitches in their neighborhoods as “crim-
inal offenders actively [seek] information 
in order to ‘work off’ their own charges.”
The use of snitching instills the realis-tic fear that one’s neighbors, family 
members, or friends might be spying on 
“Because privacy is the foundation for freedoms that 
enable the creation of one’s identity and life plans, 
the more privacy one has, the less vulnerable he is to 
oppressive state social control.”
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him. Snitching, therefore, potentially 
chills freedom of expression and associ-
ation because individuals do not know 
whom they can trust with knowledge 
about their thoughts, feelings, and con-
duct. Anything they say or do might 
later be used against them by the state. 
Indeed, snitches increase the access that 
the state has to an individual’s private 
information because they supplement the 
limited resources the state typically has 
to monitor its citizens. The harms caused 
by snitching are heightened by the fact 
that a snitch might be a family member. 
Snitching is another way that poor people 
of color feel mistrust and suspicion from 
the government. Furthermore, creating 
an atmosphere where individuals mistrust 
members of their own household express-
es complete contempt for the privacy of 
poor people of color, since privacy in the 
home is supposed to be highly valued.
Each of the tactics I have described 
in this Part is troubling in its own right. 
Yet, many individuals, particularly poor, 
young urban males of color, endure many 
of them simultaneously. They endure 
constant stops-and-frisks, which could 
potentially lead to their personal informa-
tion being placed in a gang database. They 
might also have to provide a DNA swab in 




It’s Complicated: Privacy and Domestic Violence, 
49 American Criminal Law Review 1777 (2012).
Lost in Translation: Domestic Violence, “The 
Personal is Political,” and the Criminal Justice 
System, 100 Journal of Criminal Law and Crimi-
nology 1255 (2010).
The Aftermath of Crawford and Davis: Decon-
structing the Sound of Silence, 2009 Brigham 
Young University Law Review 1.
the police. Law enforcement might track 
them further through their cell phones 
and social networking pages. Due to op-
pressive overcharging policies regarding 
minor offenses, they are in more danger 
of being convicted of crimes, which also 
leads to heightened surveillance. Even if 
a young man of color avoids a conviction, 
he still has to worry about a close friend 
or neighbor snitching on him so that he 
might avoid his own potentially hefty 
sentence. As already described, the aggre-
gation of these forms of monitoring by 
the state have the potential for substantial 
chilling effects on activities we typically 
value in our democratic society, and they 
also create serious dignitary harms.         ■
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Henry Rayhons and Donna Young did not expect to find love again after being widowed. They met in their late 60s, and first flirted in church while singing 
for the choir. Two years later, they were getting married in front 
of over 350 guests. Now in their 70s, they enjoyed several activ-
ities together, such as beekeeping, farming, and long leisurely 
drives. They also had sex. In 2010, Donna was diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s Disease. As her condition worsened, two of her 
daughters from a previous marriage moved her to a residential 
care facility. Henry would regularly visit her, and on one vis-
it in May 2014, Donna’s roommate thought she heard sexual 
noises coming from across the privacy curtain in their shared 
room. This led Donna’s daughters to seek guardianship over 
Donna and to limit Henry’s interactions with her. On August 
8, 2014, Donna passed away. A week later, Henry was arrested 
and charged with felony sexual abuse on the basis that Donna 
Rayhons suffered a “mental defect” that made her unable to 
consent. Henry abandoned his run for another term as a state 
legislator, and the criminal case garnered national media at-
tention. A week-long trial exposed details of Donna and Hen-
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ry’s relationship, Donna’s medical condi-
tion, and their alleged sexual encounter in 
May. After two days of deliberations, the 
jury acquitted Henry of wrongdoing. 
Henry and Donna’s romance high-
lights how important sexuality can be 
to human flourishing, even in later life. 
Sexuality represents a unique source of 
pleasure, meaning, and social connec-
tion. The Supreme Court has recognized 
a sexual liberty interest in Lawrence v. 
Texas, though its dimensions are actively 
debated by scholars. Other areas related to 
sexuality have also received constitutional 
protection. Marriage, which is the social 
institutionalization of a form of sexuali-
ty, has been deemed fundamental by the 
Court. The Court has also closely guarded 
the related principle of bodily integrity, 
though the constitutional justifications for 
this principle vary. Whatever the contours 
of a right to sexual expression might be, 
the degree to which it extends to people 
who have cognitive impairments remains 
unexplored.
The criminal charges against Henry show how the law can be used to reg-
ulate relationships and sexuality. The sexu-
al incapacity doctrines that were at play in 
that case are perhaps the most important 
form of sexual regulation, as they control 
access to sex by designating who is legally 
capable of sexual consent. When someone 
is deemed to lack legal capacity, the law im-
poses civil and criminal liability on sexual 
partners for battery and rape. In addition, 
it triggers vicarious liability and regulato-
ry consequences for institutions that are 
responsible for safeguarding those with 
cognitive impairments. The threat of this 
liability often leads institutions to establish 
highly restrictive sexual environments, es-
pecially in response to family member re-
quests.
The law also has expressive effects 
when it invalidates the apparent consent 
choices of those who are deemed to lack 
legal capacity. This is clearest in the case 
of criminal prohibitions, which carry 
the weight of societal condemnation for 
the acts that are deemed criminal. But 
both civil and criminal doctrines act to 
construct the sexualities of citizens by 
demarcating the boundaries of acceptable 
and unacceptable sex and reinforcing ex-
isting understandings of the sexuality of 
certain groups. To the degree that a class 
of individuals is deemed to lack sexual 
consent capacity, this can devalue them 
and construct them either as asexual and 
undesirable or as hypersexual and in need 
of control.
Sexual incapacity doctrines, howev-
er, shape more than just the older adult 
sexuality of Henry and Donna Rayhons. 
They have a wide reach, affecting sexually 
precocious minors, intoxicated teenagers 
on college campuses, and younger adults 
with Down Syndrome as well. Most states 
have adopted incapacity tests for adults 
that focus narrowly on assessing an in-
dividual’s cognitive abilities. These tests 
serve an important protective function for 
individuals with temporary and transient 
incapacity, such as those rendered incapa-
ble due to alcohol or drugs. However, this 
comes at the cost of barring many people 
“The right to sexual expression should not be 
withheld due to cognitive impairment alone.”
Sexuality and Incapacity
with persistent forms of incapacity from 
any sexual activity. This is despite the fact 
that said individuals often still have sexual 
desires and are able to engage in sexual 
decision-making with support from care-
giving networks. By applying a test that 
focuses narrowly on cognitive abilities to 
individuals with persistent impairments, 
courts are unnecessarily and permanent-
ly restricting the sexual expression of 
millions of individuals, with intensely 
negative social, psychological, and health 
consequences.
The central claim of this Article is that sexual incapacity doctrine should 
grant legal capacity to adults with per-
sistent cognitive impairments if they are 
embedded in an adequate decision-making 
support network. In other words, the right 
to sexual expression should not be withheld 
due to cognitive impairment alone. It then 
sets forth a novel sexual consent capacity 
test for this population: cognition-plus. 
To justify this claim and corresponding 
legal test, the Article provides a theory of 
sexual incapacity doctrine that is norma-
tively grounded in sexual capability, or the 
opportunity to pursue functionings asso-
ciated with sex and sexuality. This could 
include having sexual pleasure, forming a 
sexual identity, or feeling sexy. The focus of 
sexual capability is on ensuring opportuni-
ties rather than on guaranteeing happiness, 
economic resources, or freedom from state 
interference. However, capability can over-
lap significantly with these other measures 
of well-being. For example, a society that 
socializes its citizens to think that sex is 
dirty, that criminalizes non-marital sexual 
conduct, and that provides no protections 
against sexual violence, denies its citizens 
the capability for a healthy sexual life. Its 
citizens may also be less likely to be happy. 
Even if society does provide all that 
is necessary for a healthy sexual life, 
individual members of that society might, 
however, still pursue unhealthy sexual 
relationships or deny themselves sexual 
partners altogether, despite the desire for 
them. In other words, they might not take 
advantage of the opportunities to which 
they have access. Ultimately, it is the right 
of each individual to decide whether to 
pursue the functionings that are within 
reach. In this way, sexual capability is 
agnostic as to people’s sexual choices, as 
the focus is on creating the ability to have 
meaningful choice. 
An individual’s sexual capability is a 
product not only of that person’s cognitive 
abilities, but also of her social resources 
and the legal treatment of those abilities 
and resources. An analogy to driving is 
helpful. In order to have the ability to drive 
to work, one must possess physical and 
mental capacities to drive, the resources 
to buy a vehicle to transport oneself, the 
legal entitlement of a driver’s license, and 
adequately paved roads to get from point 
A to point B. The inability to drive to work 
might reflect any or all of these factors. 
Disability theorists have long emphasized 
that disabilities are not only created by the 
physical or mental impairments of the in-
dividual, but also by a society that refuses 
to accommodate these impairments. One 
important resource that many people with 
persistent cognitive impairments possess is 
a decision-making support network com-
posed of a single caregiver, a set of family 
members, or an institution’s staff. These 
capability-enhancing networks, however, 
are not recognized by the law in this area.
The cognition-plus test represents 
the legal implementation of the sexual 
capability value for people with persistent 
cognitive impairments. It derives its name 
from a joint focus on the mental capac-
ities of the subject (cognition) and the 
recognition that some individuals achieve 
sexual decision-making capacity through 
FALL 2015 [ 11 ]
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1231 (2013).
Public-Private Partnerships and Insurance Reg-
ulation, 121 Harvard Law Review 1367 (2008).
the assistance of a decision-making sup-
port network (plus). The test proceeds 
in three general steps. The first step is 
to gauge whether the individual has the 
threshold capacity to express volition 
with respect to a sexual decision. Without 
this manifestation of desire, one cannot 
proceed to be a sexual agent. If the first 
step is satisfied, the second step is to assess 
whether the individual has the necessary 
mental capacities to understand and rea-
son about the nature and consequences of 
a given sexual decision. If one meets this 
requirement, then one has sexual consent 
capacity without the need for assistance.
If one does not meet that requirement, however, the third step is to evalu-
ate whether there is an adequate deci-
sion-making support network in place. 
These networks can provide support to 
an individual in formulating her purpos-
es, connecting her desires with options, 
communicating with others, and creating 
a safe space to engage in sexual expression. 
Assessment of the system would be contex-
tual in nature, guided by the principles of 
loyalty and care from fiduciary law. Thus, 
courts would evaluate whether the system 
is free from conflicts of interest, has ade-
quate knowledge of the individual and the 
sexual decision, and has taken reasonable 
steps to protect the individual with cogni-
tive impairments from the threat of sexu-
ally transmitted diseases and pregnancy. If 
the system is adequate, then the individual 
possesses sexual consent capacity.
Both sexuality and incapacity are 
inescapable features of the human condi-
tion. They need not be mutually exclusive, 
but current sexual incapacity doctrines 
make them so for many by creating un-
duly restrictive sexual environments and 
contributing to pernicious social norms. 
The cognition-plus approach strikes the 
correct balance between protection and 
restriction, has a sound theoretical basis, 
guards against courts dictating which 
sexual acts are appropriate, and provides 
more predictability to institutions in 
formulating resident sexual policies and 
practices.                                                        ■
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In 2007, the security expert Bruce Schneier noted that,
History will record what we, here in the early decades of 
the information age, did to foster freedom, liberty, and 
democracy. Did we build information technologies that 
protected people’s freedoms even during times when so-
ciety tried to subvert them? Or did we build technolo-
gies that could easily be modified to watch and control?
Is the answer already obvious? A large literature now details 
the “watch and control” practices of businesses and govern-
ments. Add Edward Snowden’s revelations, and it is hard to 
avoid Schneier’s own 2013 “watch and control” conclusion: 
So we’re done. Welcome to a world where Google 
knows exactly what sort of porn you all like, and more 
about your interests than your spouse does. Welcome to 
a world where your cell phone company knows exactly 
where you are all the time. Welcome to the end of pri-
vate conversations, because increasingly your conversa-
A summary of The Self, the Stasi, the NSA: Privacy, Knowledge, and Complicity in the 
Surveillance State, ___ Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology ___ (forthcoming)
THE SELF, THE STASI, 
THE NSA
Privacy, Knowledge, and Complicity in the
Surveillance State
BY RICHARD WARNER AND ROBERT H. SLOAN
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“The United States certainly 
outdoes the Stasi in the 
amount it knows . . .”
tions are conducted by e-mail, 
text, or social networking sites. 
And welcome to a world where all 
of this, and everything else that 
you do or is done on a comput-
er, is saved, correlated, studied, 
passed around from company to 
company without your knowledge 
or consent; and where the govern-
ment accesses it at will without a 
warrant. Welcome to an Internet 
without privacy, and we’ve ended 
up here with hardly a fight. 
Are we done? Our answer is, “Not 
yet.” An adequate degree of privacy may 
still be possible. We conclude with a sug-
gestion about what is necessary to make 
that possibility a reality. 
We focus exclusively on governmental surveillance. We also confine our at-
tention to informational privacy, the abil-
ity to determine what others do with your 
information. Advances in information pro-
cessing technology reduce privacy by giv-
ing others immense and increasing control 
over your information. This is particularly 
true of privacy in public. The notion of pri-
vacy in public dates back over a century, at 
least to the work of the German sociologist 
Georg Simmel, who observed that people 
voluntarily limit their knowledge of each 
other as they interact in a wide variety of 
social and commercial roles. The mutual 
restraint ensures that information remains 
private relative to the interaction even if it 
is otherwise publicly available.
Current governmental surveillance 
reduces privacy in public. But to what 
extent? The question matters because ad-
equate self-realization requires adequate 
privacy in public. That in turn depends on 
informational norms, social norms that 
govern the collection, use, and distribu-
tion of information. Current surveillance 
practices threaten to undermine norm-en-
abled coordination and thereby to under-
mine privacy in public. The 1950 to 1990 
East German Stasi illustrates the threat. 
The “hidden, but for every citizen tangi-
ble omnipresence of the Stasi, damaged 
the very basic conditions for individual 
and societal creativity and development: 
Sense of one’s self, Trust, Spontaneity.” 
The United States is not East Germany, 
but it is on the road that leads there. And 
that raises the question of how far it will 
travel.  Sections I – IV support the “on the 
road” claim. Section V explores how far 
the United States will go down that road. 
Section I characterizes the concept 
of privacy in public and argues that 
informational norms play a central role in 
the creating of privacy in public. Section 
II connects the loss of privacy in public 
to the loss of self-realization. Section 
III presents five surveillance concepts 
essential to our explanation of why 
governmental surveillance undermines 
norm-enabled privacy in public. Section 
IV uses that conceptual framework to 
construct a model of how surveillance 
undermines privacy in public. Section V 
uses that model to address the question 
of how far the United States may travel 
down the road toward a Stasi-like world.
Realizing a multifaceted self means realizing multiple social roles, and 
that requires privacy in public. Perhaps 
the most obvious reason is that combining 
roles may violate others’ expectations.
Avoiding disapproval and reprisal are 
not, however, the only reasons to seek 
The Self, the Stasi, the NSA
privacy in public. Imagine, for example, 
that you eat frequently in a small Italian 
trattoria. You want to play the role of 
“customer they know very little about” in 
order to have an experience as disconnect-
ed as possible from the rest of your life. 
You want a pleasant break from that life. 
Your concern is not with their approval 
or disapproval. It is just with what they 
know. You do not merely care that more 
knowledge would change the way they re-
late to you. You do not want to have even 
to think about whether it might do that. 
The restaurant example illustrates two 
key points. First, social roles are typically 
defined in part by the way you appear to 
others when you are in them. Second, 
how you appear to others depends on 
what those others know.
In general, different requirements on 
what one is allowed, expected, or required 
to reveal or not reveal define different rela-
tionships with governmental authorities, 
acquaintances, colleagues, friends, family, 
employers, and so on. The point is a fa-
miliar one in sociology. As the sociologist 
Nippert-Eng emphasizes:  
At its core, managing privacy is 
about managing relationships 
between the self and others. ... 
privacy ... [is] a “boundary regu-
latory process by which a person 
(or group) makes himself more 
or less accessible and open to 
others.” When we regulate our 
accessibility to others—including 
the accessibility of information, 
objects, space, time, or anything 
else that we deem private—we 
simultaneously regulate our rela-
tionships with them. 
The history of the Stasi makes current surveillance practices stand out in 
sharp relief. Four features characterized the 
Stasi’s surveillance practices. 
First, massive knowing: As we noted 
earlier, the Stasi engaged in massive data 
collection and hence knew a great deal 
about East German citizens.
Second, complicity: Informants “spied 
on friends, workmates, neighbours and 
family members. Husbands spied on 
wives.” Even if the people with whom you 
interacted were not Stasi informants, the 
1 in 50 distribution of informants made 
it likely that friends and acquaintances 
of your friends and acquaintances would 
be. “Relations between people were con-
ditioned by the fact that one or the other 
of you could be one of them [the Stasi]. 
Everyone suspected everyone else and the 
mistrust this bred was the foundation of 
social existence.” 
Third, pervasive repressive use: The Sta-
si translated its massive merely knowing 
into pervasive repressive use: 
At its heart, the Stasi was an organi-
zation that monitored society for those 
who . . . ‘thought differently.’ Stasi officers 
worked tirelessly to insure that a disrup-
tion to the socialist order—be it anti-state 
graffiti, the establishment of groups that 
“Statue of workers and Police officer in front of Stasi archives, 
Mitte district, Berlin,” photo by Sanandros. From Wikipedia, 
November 11, 2015. Image modified under CC License.
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did not conform to the SED’s world-view, 
defections, or whatever form it might 
take—did not occur. 
As the novelist Anna Funder notes in 
her study of the Stasi, it “arrested, impris-
oned and interrogated anyone it chose.”
Fourth, curtailed self-realization: 
Merely knowing, complicity, and repres-
sive use severely curtailed possibilities for 
self-realization. As Gary Bruce puts it in 
his study of the Stasi, 
One does not detect from East 
Germans’ reflections on their past 
that they were gripped by a par-
alyzing fear, in the psychological 
sense of the word—although one 
interview subject did say she “was 
always afraid”—but rather a deep 
resignation that one was not the 
master of one’s own destiny, that 
to run afoul of the Stasi, even 
unintentionally, was to sacrifice 
power over one’s life and the life 
opportunities of family members.
The United States certainly outdoes the Stasi in the amount it knows and—
perhaps—even in the extent of citizen 
complicity. In this way, the United States 
has traveled down the road that leads to 
the Stasi. But it is far from Stasi-like sur-
veillance. It differs—only but critically—in 
being far more restrained in its use of infor-
mation to discourage and prevent behavior 
the government finds undesirable. This is 
less reassuring than it may seem, however. 
As James Rule notes, there is a “tendency 
of surveillance systems to spread. It simply 
lies in the interests of both government 
and private surveillance operations to ex-
pand—to cover more people and more of 
the lives of the people they cover.”  
We conclude with Glen Greenwald’s 2014 version of Schneier’s 2007 
question with which we began:
We stand at a historic crossroads. 
Will the digital age usher in the 
individual liberation and politi-
cal freedoms that the Internet is 
uniquely capable of unleashing? 
Or will it bring about a system of 
omnipresent monitoring and con-
trol, beyond the dreams of even 
the greatest tyrants of the past? 
Right now, either path is possible. 
Our actions will determine where 
we end up.                                       ■
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Despite some of the blustery rhetoric attendant to the ongoing market transition, lawyers and the market for legal services are not going away.  Lawyers serve inte-
gral roles in a wide variety of social and political systems.  Their 
work supports the proper functioning of markets and helps in-
dividuals and organizations vindicate their respective rights.  At 
the same time, the processes associated with completing their 
work—as well as the contours of their respective expertise and 
judgment—are already changing.   These changes are being 
driven by a number of economic and technological trends, 
many of which Larry Ribstein identified in a series of import-
ant articles published in the years before his untimely death.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the legal services in-
dustry is not a monolith, and change has and will continue to 
manifest in different ways across different tranches of work. At 
the high end of the market, lawyers often help their clients nav-
igate increasingly complex legal, regulatory, and institutional 
environments. Indeed, helping navigate complexity is part of 
the core value proposition offered by a significant number of 
lawyers. Arguably, the legal system and society are getting more
An excerpt from The MIT School of Law? A Perspective on Legal Education in the 21st 
Century, 5 University of Illinois Law Review 1431 (2014).
THE MIT SCHOOL OF LAW?
A Perspective on Legal Education in the 21st Century
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complex; given complexity is at the core 
of bespoke work, the market for lawyers 
that can thrive in complex environments 
should remain robust. The ongoing 
question for legal educators is how best 
to equip future legal professionals to de-
liver value for their respective clients in a 
variety of complex multi-disciplinary en-
vironments. Whether it is a multi-billion 
dollar M&A deal, the construction of a 
comprehensive and legally defensible doc-
ument management and retention system, 
a challenging piece of bio-tech centered 
patent infringement litigation, or Dodd 
Frank compliance, high-end lawyering is 
an exercise in helping clients navigate in 
opaque environments.
Despite growth in complexity and like-ly inelastic demand for the very best 
lawyers, a non-trivial fraction of today’s 
legal work is not high-end legal architect-
ing and does not require nearly as many 
individuals in order to see the work accom-
plished. For a certain range of tasks, high 
cost human capital can be substituted for 
less expensive alternatives—whether this 
is through labor arbitrage, better process-
es, or software. In the medium and long 
term, some of the largest financial returns 
likely will be obtained by the set of indi-
viduals who are able to help transition the 
legal industry to the proper reallocation of 
the legal production function. Both exist-
ing lawyers and law students are awakening 
to this reality and a non-trivial number are 
building companies that will help support 
the transition.
The transition is underway in high 
to medium complexity work and to a 
lesser extent in the retail segment of the 
legal market. So-called “regular people 
law”—i.e., affordable legal services for the 
middle class, pro-bono and “low bono” 
market segment—still remains illusive. 
Using technology, process, and lower cost 
infrastructure, there are a number of nota-
ble efforts to better serve the underserved 
and thereby meaningfully and sustainably 
provide access to justice. However, much 
more work remains to be done.
As Larry predicted, law’s information 
revolution is very much underway. Wheth-
er the clients are institutions or just regu-
lar folks, it is a process and efficiency rev-
olution. For lawyers, substantive expertise 
is (of course) a minimum expectation, but 
going forward it may not be the primary 
dimension of competition. Within legal 
organizations (both law firms and, more 
importantly, corporate law divisions) and 
in the legal entrepreneurship community, 
process, workflow, metrics, efficiency, and 
analytics are beginning to take hold. It is 
transforming the practice of law in ways 
that are not yet fully realized. Complete 
change typically takes longer than it 
should. Organizations are sticky, due to 
noisy signaling and other factors, and 
markets take time to clear. But there are 
signs that this time is indeed different.
Taking stock of these changes, this 
Essay is a thought exercise about a hy-
pothetical MIT School of Law—an 
institution with the type of curriculum 
that might help prepare students to have 
the appropriate level of substantive legal 
expertise and other useful skills that will 
allow them to deliver value to their clients 
as well as develop and administer the rules 
governing markets, politics, and society as 
we move further into the 21st Century. It 
is a blueprint based upon the best avail-
able information, and like any other plan 
of action would need to be modified to 
take stock of shifting realities over time. 
It is not a solution for all of legal educa-
tion. Instead, it is a targeted description 
of an institution and its substantive con-
tent that could compete very favorably 
in the existing and future market. It is a 
depiction of an institution whose students 
The MIT School of Law?
would arguably be in high demand. It is 
a high-level sketch of an institution that 
would be substantively relevant, appropri-
ately practical, theoretically rigorous, and 
world class. In other words, it is a plant 
that can survive and thrive outside those 
hothouse walls.
I f Larry was right and law schools now have to deal with markets, the question 
is how best to do so. As of this very min-
ute, there are approximately two graduat-
ing law students for each available law job. 
This  situation  will hopefully improve in 
the coming years, but, generally speaking, 
changing the macroeconomic environment 
is not within the province of an individual 
educational institution. The demand for 
legal services is set exogenously by the 
dynamics of the relevant market(s). What 
an individual institution can do is compete 
and do the best possible with respect to 
its students. For many institutions, if 
they accept the status quo contours of the 
market as given, they will underperform. 
The way to win is to stop trying to be the 
“50th or 100th best Harvard and Yale” and 
instead to concentrate on outflanking these 
and other institutions by becoming leaders 
in law’s major emerging employment 
sectors.
The objective function that educa-
tional institutions must seek to optimize is 
high quality jobs that support the respec-
tive educational investment by students. 
Some institutions easily satisfy this crite-
ria, while many others fall short.  As Bill 
Henderson has argued: “[T]he new gold 
standard employment outcome is full-
time, long-term professional law-related 
jobs. The issue of how to maximize this 
outcome is so pressing and intricate that it 
may warrant trade-offs in the admissions 
process, favoring students will lower cre-
dentials but more rock-solid employment 
prospects on the backend at graduation.”
The key is to build a better product 
and demonstrate its superiority to the 
marketplace. Obviously, this is a non-triv-
ial endeavor. The first question to ponder 
is what precisely constitutes a better prod-
uct? Better for what set of tasks that law-
yers undertake? The legal education and 
legal services market contain a series of 
market distortions, information asymme-
tries, and agency problems. In addition, 
both the market for legal education and a 
market for legal services feature a variety 
of noisy signals. Namely, it is difficult to 
overcome strong brands and the noisy 
lagging signals that surround the classifi-
cation of quality. At all places within the 
industry—law schools, law professors, 
practicing lawyers, law firms, and gener-
al counsels—assessing the quality of the 
relevant product or service is extremely 
difficult.
On the education side of the equa-
tion, students historically seek branded 
institutions. Specifically, they tended to 
seek institutions with higher U.S. News 
rankings. The general assumption held 
“[L]aw’s information revolution is very much underway. 
Whether the clients are institutions or just regular 
folks, it is a process and efficency revolution.”
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by students (and faculty) is that a higher 
ranked institution would result in better 
labor market outcomes (as measured by 
dollars or other related quality measures). 
From the perspective of many students, 
whether those outcomes were due to 
sorting or the treatment effect of the 
underlying education is actually imma-
terial. The would-be students voted with 
their feet and they often did so with little 
deep understanding of the quality of the 
product being offered or how their re-
spective skills or background were suited 
to offerings at particular institutions.   In 
many unfortunate instances, would-be 
students were often myopic about their 
own likely prospects—their own “lives 
in the law.” Incoming students too often 
selected programs, academic tracks, and 
institutions that were poorly configured 
to the economic realities of their current 
and future legal labor market.
The legal labor market (particularly at the entry level) is also very noisy. 
Large law firm partners sell their time as 
well as the time of their associates to their 
clients. To the extent there were questions 
raised regarding why a particular associ-
ate was working on their matter, the firm 
could answer with statements such as “well 
they went to XYZ elite institution or were 
at the very top of their class at ABC region-
al institution.” This brand signal served as 
a placeholder for quality because, as noted 
above, lawyer quality is among the most 
difficult of measurement problems. Both 
in law and in consumer markets general-
ly, in the absence of clearly better alterna-
tive measures, firms and clients fixate on 
well-established brands.
An entrepreneurially-minded law 
school has to overcome the existing brand 
signals. This is necessary as the institution 
seeks to obtain an increasing share of the 
existing jobs, and it is important in order 
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to position its students to take advantage 
of places where new labor market open-
ings are created. The high level workflow is 
simple—train, attract, and place students 
(in that order). To understand where the 
placement opportunities lie, one must 
work backwards starting with the employ-
ment end of the pipeline and ask employ-
ers this question: “What would it take for 
you to hire one (or more) of our gradu-
ates?” This information is a useful starting 
point but not complete because the target 
is shifting and thus even the employers are 
not quite sure what they want.
For example, a recent MacArthur 
Foundation study noted sixty-five per-
cent of grad school students will end up 
undertaking a job that has not yet been 
invented. While such extreme uncertainty 
is arguably not present in the legal services 
industry, this statistic points us to a basic 
insight regarding labor markets—past 
performance is not necessarily indicative 
of future results. This is particularly true 
in periods of disruption.                          ■
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